麻豆传媒在线

Image: Imamzadeh Saleh Holy Shrine in Tajrish Square, Northern Tehran

Provided by: Mari Nukui

Iran holds high importance in Russia's regional and Middle Eastern policies. Particularly since the 2014 "Ukraine Crisis," for a Russia that has faced economic sanctions from the West and global isolation, cooperation with Iran has become vital—not only from the perspective of its own diplomacy but also for maintaining regional stability. Furthermore, in the "Syrian issue," where Russia wishes to take a leading role in the resolution, coordination with Iran and Turkey is indispensable.

On the other hand, for Iran, whose relationship with the United States is increasingly deteriorating, the relationship with Russia is also important. Russia has long shared interests with Iran in opposing the U.S., and it can be said that it has generally maintained good relations with Iran, such as by opposing sanctions against the country. Recently, as the U.S. strengthens sanctions against Iran, Russia continues to advocate for the continuation of Iranian crude oil exports. Iran is not only strengthening bilateral relations with Russia but is also participating as an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), led by China and Russia, with the aim of becoming a formal member. While Iran has tense relations with Israel and many Arab nations, Russia maintains generally good relations with Israel as well as Arab nations, and there is a high possibility that Russia will hold the key to future Middle East peace.

Furthermore, the tightening of relations between Iran and Russia has become particularly prominent in recent years. In August 2018, an agreement was reached among the five Caspian Sea littoral states. Formerly, the Soviet Union and Iran were the only littoral states of the Caspian Sea, the world's largest lake, but with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of littoral states increased to five. As the use of Western technology became possible, allowing for the extraction of subsea resources such as oil and natural gas, issues regarding territorial waters and the legal status of the Caspian Sea emerged among the littoral states. Although resource extraction proceeded by establishing facts on the ground, these issues caused regional tension and made the construction of subsea pipelines in the Caspian Sea difficult. In last year's agreement, the legal status of the Caspian Sea resulted in an ambiguous conclusion—a special status that is neither a sea nor a lake—but the decision that Caspian Sea issues would be decided only by the littoral states and that the entry of warships from non-littoral states would be prohibited can be seen as a major victory for Russia and Iran, who wish to repel Western, and particularly U.S., influence.

Russia has strategically used the Caspian Sea in its Middle East policy, such as by launching cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea into Syria, but with this agreement, Russia has established maritime control over the Caspian Sea, and its strategic importance is likely to increase further. Additionally, military cooperation between Russia and Iran in the Caspian Sea is expected to become even closer.

Note that the extraction of resources and the construction of subsea pipelines became possible through the agreement of the relevant countries. However, the construction of subsea pipelines requires the littoral states to approve the results of environmental assessments, allowing Russia—which had opposed subsea pipelines as they would diminish its regional influence—to secure a loophole.

Even before this Caspian Sea agreement, regional cooperation among the Caspian littoral states and surrounding countries had been revitalized toward infrastructure development such as railways, roads, and canals, as well as the promotion of economy and tourism; this agreement further promotes that mood. In particular, Russia intends to complete the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a roughly 7,200-kilometer route connecting itself with India via Azerbaijan and Iran by ship, rail, and road—as early as 2020. Once completed, it should become a transport network capable of competing with China's "Belt and Road Initiative," and for a Russia that is strengthening cooperation with China on the surface while harboring growing distrust deep down, it could serve as an important tool to regain influence in Eurasia. If that happens, Iran will also become a Eurasian hub, and its presence in the region will increase.

However, the U.S. has now pivoted toward a total embargo on Iranian crude oil, and the exemptions provided to countries like Japan were abolished in May 2019. This is a difficult situation for Japan, which considers the Japan-U.S. alliance the foundation of its diplomacy, but in view of Iran's importance, I believe Japan should seek the best possible diplomatic policy.

In September 2018, Foreign Minister Taro Kono visited the three Caucasus countries that serve as a junction between Russia and Iran. This was the first visit to Azerbaijan by a Japanese Foreign Minister since 1999, and the first-ever visits to Armenia and Georgia. While the Caucasus is not very familiar to Japan, it is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and Azerbaijan is a resource-producing country, making it a region of extremely high strategic significance. Showing Japan's willingness to strengthen relations with the three Caucasus countries and contribute to the stability and development of a region that faces many conflicts has great significance in Japanese diplomacy and should be highly evaluated. The Caspian Sea region—comprising Russia, the Caucasus, and Iran—is the central point for peace and stability in the Middle East and Eurasia. Japan should pursue a comprehensive and flexible diplomacy while viewing these regions not as isolated "points" but as a collective "area."